• Advertisement

Vladimir Putin

Discussions regarding wars around the globe
prom
Posts: 236
Joined: Sat Aug 18, 2012 4:14 am
Location: Calgary
x 1

Vladimir Putin

Postby prom » Tue Jan 06, 2015 5:10 am

Putin - OCCRP’S PERSON OF YEAR FOR 2014

http://occrp.org/person-of-the-year/2014/

Who is OCCRP?

<<<The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) founded in 2006 is a consortium of investigative centers, media and journalists operating in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Central America. OCCRP is the only full-time investigative reporting organization that specializes in organized crime and corruption. It publishes its stories through local media and in English through its website. OCCRP is an early practitioner of collaborative cross-border investigative journalism by non-profit journalism organizations, an approach that is gaining recognition in the United States and now Europe. It is partners with the Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) in Jordan, Connectas in Colombia, the International Center for Journalists in Washington, African Network of Centers for Investigative Reporting in South Africa and InsightCrime in Colombia. It has worked with hundreds of news organizations including the Guardian, Financial Times, Le Soir, the BBC, Time Magazine, Al Jazeera and other major media.

The project has been involved in a number of high profile investigations including looking at the offshore services industry, organized crime ownership in football clubs, casinos and the security industry.[1][2][3] In 2013, it broke new ground on the Magnitsky case, the largest tax fraud in Russian history, and managed to demonstrate that funds stolen from the Russian treasury ended up in a company now owned by the son of Moscow's former transportation minister. Some of the money was used to buy high end real estate in Wall Street.[4] US prosecutors have since sought to seize $18 million in properties from the company.[5]>>>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organized_ ... ng_Project
0 x

prom
Posts: 236
Joined: Sat Aug 18, 2012 4:14 am
Location: Calgary
x 1

Re: Vladimir Putin

Postby prom » Fri Jan 30, 2015 7:09 am

They have no shame in Absurdistan Parliament. This is a government that some delusional people are looking up to:

http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/773830

Russian lawmakers mull statement condemning GDR’s annexation by FRG in 1989

A relevant order was issued by State Duma speaker Sergey Naryshkin to the parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs as it was proposed earlier in the day by lawmaker Nikolay Ivanov. MOSCOW, January 28. /TASS/. Members of the Russian parliament mull drafting a statement to condemn the annexation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by the Federative Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1989, a historic event commonly known as the reunification of East and West Germany.
A relevant order was issued by State Duma speaker Sergey Naryshkin to the parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs as it was proposed earlier in the day by Nikolay Ivanov, a lawmaker from the Russian Communist Party.
"Dear Sergey Yevgenyevich (Naryshkin), we were all sympathizing with you, when on January 26 at a news conference of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) you were refuting verbal assaults of PACE President Anne Brasseur, who accused Russia of ‘Crimea’s annexation'," Ivanov said, addressing Naryshkin on Wednesday morning.
"I propose that as a form of a retaliatory step you give order to the Committee on Foreign Affairs to prepare a statement condemning the annexation of the German Democratic Republic by the Federative Republic of Germany in 1989," Ivanov said. "Moreover, unlike in Crimea, there was no nationwide referendum in GDR."
0 x

prom
Posts: 236
Joined: Sat Aug 18, 2012 4:14 am
Location: Calgary
x 1

Re: Vladimir Putin

Postby prom » Wed May 27, 2015 7:11 am

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/05/2 ... cist-State

Putin Isn’t Reviving the USSR, He’s Creating a Fascist State

Russian President Vladimir Putin has memorably called the breakup of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a tragedy, and that has led many to believe that he is hoping to restore the old USSR as he consolidates control within Russia and projects military power outward into Ukraine and beyond.

However, the government Putin is building in Moscow bears little resemblance to Socialism, Communism, or anything that Karl Marx would have endorsed based on his thinking. Surely, the man who described religion as the “opium of the people” wouldn’t likely associate himself with a regime that has rehabilitated the Russian Orthodox Church as a key element of Russians’ patriotic identity.

No, the new Russia looks more like a copy of a totalitarian state from Europe’s dark past, dressed in 21st century clothing.

“When you hear the word Fascism you always have to ask yourself: what are they talking about, how are they using the word?” Oxford University Professor Roger Griffin, one of the world’s foremost scholars of Fascism, once warned in a 2012 interview. “The word ‘Fascist’ can be a simple way of insulting somebody, of saying that they are horrible, nasty, that they should go away.”

Indeed, it’s a favorite epithet of none other than Vladimir Putin, whose surrogates in the Russian leadership alternately accuse the government in Ukraine of either associating with Fascists or actually being Fascist.

What we have here, though, may be an example of what mental health professionals call projection.

A more precise definition of Fascism, according to Griffin, is a political ideology with three broad elements: populist ultra-nationalism, the claim that the country has become soft or ‘decadent,’ and a “rebirth myth.” The third is the promise, typically made by Fascist leaders, to restore a country to some sort of former greatness, usually taken from it treacherously by its enemies, either external or internal.

American scholar Robert Paxton has identified other elements of Fascism, including an obsession with reversing national decline, usually blamed on betrayal, through restriction of civil liberties, purification of the people, military strength, and national expansion. Violence, Paxton notes, is not seen as inherently bad in a Fascist system, and its use to eliminate challenges to the state is glorified.

Given the massive changes imposed on Russian society in the past several years, it’s easy to argue that, under Putin, the country is turning into at least a quasi-Fascist state.

The rebirth myth is a near-constant theme for Putin, who has for years now been feeding the Russian people a steady narrative about the global conspiracy to weaken Russia, and the need to rise to greatness again.

The erosion of civil liberties and the rise of ultra-nationalism are, likewise, obvious features of Russia in 2015. Over the past few months, Putin accused “the West” of being responsible for Russia’s economic ills. Then he piled on, alleging that Ukrainian troops were in league with NATO against the rebels and Russia. Putin’s propaganda war against the West finally hit home.

Last week, for example, Putin signed into law a new measure that allows government prosecutors to declare certain foreign organizations “undesirable” without trial or other approval by a judge, making it possible for Russian citizens to be punished for associating with them. The justification is that outside forces, mainly the United States and its NATO allies, are allegedly seeking to undermine Russia, and must be stopped.

Two weeks ago, one of the remaining English-language newspapers in Russia reported on the development of the “Safe Capital” project, in which vigilante squads made up of men drawn from military associations and groups like the ultra-nationalist Cossacks, would patrol Moscow to enforce public order. The squads, which will be uniformed, will be organized by United Russia – the party of Vladimir Putin, which controls the Russian parliament.

The government, meanwhile, has gradually consolidated control over the press by forcing foreign owners to reduce their holdings in Russian media companies while at the same time funding a growing network of government-run media outlets to feed Kremlin-friendly stories to both the Russian people and the rest of the world.
As for increased militarism and expansionist tendencies, the Russian government has greatly accelerated its spending on the military, even as its economy slides into recession. At the same time, it is occupying Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, continuing to support armed rebellion in eastern Ukraine, and regularly mounting threatening military patrols either inside or close to the territory of its neighbors.

Russians have also witnessed ongoing moves to purge the country of people seen as weak or threatening to the regime, from legislation targeting homosexuals, to the murder of prominent dissident journalists and politicians, most recently noted Putin critic Boris Nemtsov.

Another characteristic typical of Fascist states is the conflict of interest between the business community and the ruling political party. Enterprise and private profit are typically encouraged within the context of service to the state. It has been well established that many of the country’s top business leaders have close ties to Putin, and earlier this year, the Kremlin announced that members of Putin’s cabinet would begin to serve on the boards of directors of ostensibly private companies.

Finally, there is Putin himself.

Historically, Fascist governments have relied on strong, charismatic individual leaders in the mold of Hitler or Mussolini, while at the same time encouraging a sort of masculine ideal for the population at large – Hitler’s idealized Aryan, or Mussolini’s “new Man.” In today’s Russia, Putin seems to play both roles.

The Russian media routinely idolizes Putin as a model of masculinity, whether he is pictured toting a hunting rifle while bare-chested, practicing judo, or playing hockey. (Putin, who took up hockey in late middle age, scored an improbable eight goals last week, in a game with former professional hockey stars.)

In the end, whether Russia in 2015 really has transformed into a Fascist state, or is breaking new ground in the area of oppressive totalitarianism is a question for academics. Regardless of how the system is eventually labeled, the newly aggressive power on Europe’s Eastern doorstep is exhibiting many of the traits of past regimes that have caused untold human suffering. Today, the world should be paying close attention.
0 x

prom
Posts: 236
Joined: Sat Aug 18, 2012 4:14 am
Location: Calgary
x 1

Re: Vladimir Putin

Postby prom » Wed Jun 10, 2015 6:52 am

The Pro-Kremlin Youth Group: Putin's Propaganda Machine


https://news.vice.com/video/the-pro-kre ... latedvideo
0 x

prom
Posts: 236
Joined: Sat Aug 18, 2012 4:14 am
Location: Calgary
x 1

Re: Vladimir Putin

Postby prom » Fri Jun 17, 2016 4:38 pm

Vladimir Putin's Secret Weapon

http://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/vla ... DHP#page=1

Every day, the red line ticks up and down. Some weeks it trends higher, others lower. It measures the most important vital sign of Russia’s body politic: the popularity of Vladimir Putin. In the Kremlin they call it the reiting—the Russian pronunciation of rating—and the reiting rules supreme over all of the nation’s political and economic decisions.

When it stands—as it did in late May—at a comfortable 82 percent, Russia’s elite breathes easy. When it dips as low at 62 percent—as it did in 2011 when Putin announced his return for a third presidential term—every resource is scrambled to reverse the trend at any cost. In recent times, that has meant anything from staging a lavish Olympic Games to taking the country to war in Ukraine and Syria.

The reiting is compiled from many sources, including a vast new monitoring body created by the Kremlin with the aim of spotting and crushing discontent. But the one that’s most trusted is run not by Putin loyalists but by a tiny, beleaguered team of glasnost-era liberals. It’s called the Levada Center, after its late founder, Yuri Levada, and is the last independent pollster in Russia. It was launched in 1988 at the suggestion of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and the center’s job was to report the truth, however uncomfortable—amazingly, a role it still fulfills a generation later in a very different Russia.

“The Soviet government had no adequate way to understand what was happening in society—they needed to answer the question ‘What are the people thinking?’ if they were to survive,” says Natalia Zorkina, a member of Levada’s original team when the center was founded. “The study of public opinion was meant to become an institution on which a democratic society could be built.”
It didn’t work out that way. The administration of former President Boris Yeltsin that inherited the collapsing Soviet economy quickly discovered, thanks to Levada’s meticulous polling, that by the mid-1990s, what most Russians were thinking was that Yeltsin and his reformist bums should be thrown out. There was panic in the Kremlin and talk of canceling elections, but a small group of media moguls, editors and self-described “political technologists” convinced the Kremlin to take a different course: Instead of bowing to the pressure of public opinion, they offered to shape it.

“All politics is information politics,” says Gleb Pavlovsky, one of the original political technologists, who was a key architect of the alliance of pollsters and media owners that eventually brought Putin to power in 2000. “There is no difference for us between facts and perceptions.”

And so the magical thinking that blossomed into today’s Putin regime was born: Public opinion was something to be controlled and shaped, not something to be listened to. “By the mid-1990s, the Kremlin began to give up on winning any kind of political debate in a public forum,” says Zorkina. “The character of power changed. The basis of the Kremlin’s legitimacy changed…from people making a democratic choice between different political visions to getting as many people as possible to back the national leader. Public opinion began as a foundation of democracy but is now a tool of authoritarianism.”

The story of the Levada Center, then, is also the story of Russia’s transition from flawed democracy to a kind of consensual autocracy. And at the heart of the system was the methodology Yuri Levada thought would bring Russia freedom—the careful monitoring of what ordinary Russians think about everything, from the price of cheese to American imperialism, from pensions and trash collection to nuclear missiles and God.

Putin’s Magic Circle

The Levada Center occupies two suites of cluttered offices at the back of a former pre-revolutionary hotel not far from Red Square. Wilting spider plants and leaning bookcases fill the corridors, and the older employees have the earnest, scruffy look of late-Soviet-era intellectuals. On chunky computers, a 50-strong team at headquarters coordinates a nationwide network of 3,000 pollsters, who spend their days questioning ordinary Russians by phone, internet and in person. The center is registered as a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) and pays its way with a mix of commercial market research and political and economic surveys for universities and media organisations. About 2 percent of its revenue comes from foreign clients.

“The Levada team are ‘former people,’” says one veteran Russian TV anchor, using the term that Bolsheviks once used for aristocrats and bourgeois who had no place in Soviet society. “They believe passionately in getting the real data, not just telling the people who pay them what they want to hear. They are important for anyone who cares about seeing a real picture of Russia, not the one that appears on the television screen.” (The anchor requested anonymity because he still works for state television, which increasingly disapproves of Levada.)

Putin’s Kremlin also believes passionately in getting data on public opinion—though the methods it uses are questionable. Last December, the Kremlin appointed Irina Makiyeva, a former state bank executive, to head a massive new polling service to monitor Russia’s political temperature in minute detail. Under the direct aegis of the Federal Guard Service—Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service that is charged with the president’s personal security—it deploys thousands of state employees to scan local press and social networks for signs of discontent.

“We conduct constant monitoring, especially in the problem cities,” Makiyeva promised the Russian Cabinet, unveiling a classification system—green, yellow and red—to warn of potential political or social unrest. The state also controls the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, or VTsIOM (the original name of the Levada Center before a Kremlin takeover in 2003 forced the core team to leave and start over), as well as the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), which attempts to do a similar job.

The problem is that such state-backed polls “have become a form of propaganda in themselves,” says Pavlovsky. “The questions are presented as: Do you agree with the norm, the majority?”

A recent example was a poll in Crimea—which Russia annexed in 2014—ordered by Putin and conducted by VTsIOM in January. Crimean Tatar activists had blown up electricity pylons, and the government of Ukraine, on which Crimea entirely relies for its energy, refused to restore service unless Russia acknowledged that the territory remained part of Ukraine. The Kremlin’s pollsters called home telephone numbers and asked people whether they preferred to sit in the dark or agreed to accede to Ukraine’s demands.

According to VTsIOM, 96 percent said they preferred to suffer in the dark—a result widely trumpeted by Russian state TV as a sign of the locals’ willingness to undergo hardship in order to stay part of Russia. But in reality, Pavlovsky says, “this is not an opinion poll, it is an invitation to prove your loyalty…. We are seeing lately that for the first time [since the fall of Communism], people are afraid to answer questions, especially in small provincial towns. They believe they will suffer consequences from giving a disloyal answer.”

Nonetheless, such government-run polling is a mainstay of the Kremlin’s decision-making process. According to Mikhail Zygar, former editor-in-chief of the opposition channel Dozhd TV and author of the best-selling All the Kremlin’s Men, a study of the Putin regime, “Every [Kremlin] action is based absolutely on this polling…. These polls confirm that everything they’re doing is right, that Putin is popular and the people love him.”

Pavlovsky knows the system well: He was one of its designers. “Today, they keep to the same arrangement that was set up in the late 1990s,” says Pavlovsky, a former dissident who spent three years in exile in Siberia for anti-Soviet activity. Every Thursday, Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Vyacheslav Volodin chairs a meeting that includes leaders of the official United Russia party, senior members of the administration and pollsters Valery Fyodorov and Aleksandr Olson, the directors of VTsIOM and FOM, respectively. “They report on the state of public opinion on a range of threats, everything that could potentially affect Putin’s level of popularity,” says Pavlovsky. “They decide on how to work with this challenge.”

Under Yeltsin and in the early Putin years, this weekly meeting was also attended by the heads of Russia’s TV channels. Today, the TV bosses—including Channel One General Director Konstantin Ernst and Oleg Dobrodeyev of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Co.—have a separate meeting with Volodin on Fridays, after he has presented his summary of the pollsters’ report personally to Putin and his inner Cabinet.

“The television plan for the coming week would be decided,” recalls Pavlovsky, who attended such meetings from autumn 1995 until he resigned as a senior adviser to the presidential administration in 2011. “The Kremlin gives the general direction but not the details, then Dobrodeyev and Ernst are the executors. They approach news like a TV serial—but it is very professionally produced. The stories may be exaggerated, but they are convincing.” Television news, he says, “is the new form of agitprop”—the Stalin-era system of agitation and propaganda that aimed to shape the consciousness of the proletariat.

The system is a kind of magic circle: Opinion polls shape official television coverage, which in turn shapes public opinion.

It was uber-oligarch Boris Berezovsky who first understood the political might of television when he took over Russia’s main TV channel, now known as Channel One, and turned its influence into money and power. But it was Putin, in the first year of his rule, who gathered that power to the Kremlin, kicking out all potential rivals (including Berezovsky) and quickly shutting down all non-state media. The result, says Levada’s Zorkina, is that the Kremlin has unprecedented control over what Russians see, hear—and think.

“Public opinion does not exist as an independent entity in Russia as it does in the West,” she says. “In Russia, people have completely decoupled themselves from the political process. They don’t believe that they can change anything. Even in the 1990s, only a tiny proportion of people, perhaps 2 or 3 percent, were politically active. Now it is even less.”

The lack of an alternative leader, or of any real political debate, helps to explain one of Levada’s strangest recent findings—that Putin’s popularity remains sky-high, even as Russians’ standard of living has plummeted. Since 2014, the ruble has lost half of its value, inflation has hit double digits, spending on health and education has been cut, and Russia has unilaterally banned the import of U.S. and European food. Yet the Kremlin has apparently succeeded in defying the laws of political gravity: Putin’s personal reiting has become decoupled from the unfolding economic disaster over which he presides.

The secret, of course, is as old as politics itself. If not quite bread and circuses—the Kremlin’s been desperately short of bread over the past two years—then certainly war and circuses. When Putin returned to the presidency in 2012 after a term as prime minister, his rating dipped as low as 62 percent, and 100,000 people came onto the streets of Moscow in protest. The Kremlin’s response was to throw $48 billion—back then, with oil at $140 a barrel, it could still afford it—at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics (according to the Anti-Corruption Foundation, an NGO), making it the most expensive Olympics ever staged.

In 2014, as oil prices crumbled, Putin annexed Crimea and backed rebels in eastern Ukraine, filling TV programming with news flashes from the front and fostering a surge of national pride. According to Daniel Treisman, a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, “‘Occupy Crimea’ was at least in part an impulsive response to both ‘Occupy Maidan’ and ‘Occupy Abai’”—the popular protests staged in Ukraine’s Kiev and Moscow, respectively, that deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and badly rattled the Kremlin.

“All the peaks of Putin’s popularity have been as a result of wars,” says Zorkina. “Chechnya in 2000, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015.”

Another part of the formula is also age-old: create enemies. In the early 1990s, a series of Levada surveys found that significant majorities of Russians admired America’s culture and values—and 43 percent were willing to admit that all of the USSR’s problems were homegrown. In January 2015, Levada found that 81 percent of Russians had a negative attitude toward the U.S. What’s more, 63 percent of respondents this year blamed their country’s economic woes on “outside enemies.”

Small wonder: Since 2014, Russia’s media have blamed the U.S. government for everything from backing a fascist junta in Ukraine to mounting an “information attack” on Russia by planting stories about top Putin cronies’ Panamanian offshore accounts and systemic doping of their Olympic athletes. Last November, Dmitry Kiselev, Russia’s most influential TV anchor, suggested that the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) was an American creation.

“They have re-created the Soviet siege mentality, the complex of being surrounded by enemies,” says Zorkina. “Putin has also rekindled the old Russian imperial idea, with its superiority complex and the idea that we are on some special historical path.”

The idea is that Russia is at war and that therefore its citizens must be ready to face hardship and sacrifice for the Motherland. Never was that logic clearer than when a Russian charter plane was blown out of the sky by an ISIS bomb soon after taking off from the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on October 31, 2015. All 224 people on board, mostly Russians on vacation, were killed. It was a direct response to Russia launching an air campaign in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For any Western leader, such an attack would be a devastating blow. Yet Levada showed that Putin’s all-important reiting actually climbed in the aftermath of the bombing—while support for the Syria campaign remained at a buoyant 60 percent (though down from 72 percent at the war’s outset).

“Frightened people want a strong leader,” says Dmitry K., one of Levada’s Moscow-based pollsters, who works the phones and conducts focus groups. (The center keeps the identity of its polling staff confidential to avoid possible corruption.) “When you are in a war situation, anyone who criticises the leadership is a mutineer. In other words, a traitor.”

The allegation of treachery has become the Levada Center’s most pressing problem—its mission often involves reporting things the Kremlin doesn’t want to hear. For instance, one recent Levada poll found that one in four Russians with a college degree is contemplating emigration. “These are the most secure social groups, people [who have] achieved success, recognition and wealth in Russia,” the center’s current director, Lev Gudkov, wrote in an analysis of the results. “[They] understand that they will not be able to live under growing authoritarianism.”

Another unwelcome finding came last December, when Levada reported that faith in Russian television news—the central plank of Kremlin control—had fallen to just 41 percent, down from 79 percent in 2009.

No one was surprised when Russia’s prosecutor’s office began cracking down on the Levada Center. The attacks began in May 2013, when Levada’s posting of poll results and analyses was deemed to be "political activity" because they "influence public opinion.” Prosecutors demanded that the center register as a “foreign agent”—a term synonymous with spying in Russian—because of Levada’s small number of international grants and clients. Agents from the prosecutor’s office rifled through the center’s files and impounded computer hard drives—but eventually suspended the case.

“Their aim is to keep us in a state of uncertainty,” says Zorkina. “Just so we know that we are under their eye.”

Levada has been spared—for the moment—because it seems that a dwindling number of the Kremlin’s current generation of political technologists still respect reliable polling, however unwelcome the results. But the fact that Levada is under pressure is a dangerous sign that Putin is retreating into his own echo chamber. Putin “orders up all this propaganda—but he is also the main target of it,” says Pavlovsky.

“The older undemocratic regimes become, the more mistakes their leaders tend to make…. Cutting themselves off from accurate information is one of the most common—and most self-destructive,” argues UCLA professor Treisman, author of The Return: Russia's Journey From Gorbachev to Medvedev. “Surprisingly often, authoritarian governments collapse less because of well-organized opposition than because of their own errors. Overconfident and misinformed, leaders stumble into danger and lack the skill and vision to get out.”

The Levada Center can’t predict the future. But its body of polling is the clearest insight anyone can have into how the Putin regime might end—or, as Zorkina puts it, “where the cracks run” through the foundations of Kremlin power.

“Society is full of such cracks—from poor health care to unemployment to rising prices—but there is no sense of solidarity, no interest in participation in politics. The only thing that unites Russian society is its support for Putin,” says Zorkina. “There are no forms of social unity, no political parties or social organisations or trade unions. They have all been suppressed, so there is no way people can legitimately express their protest…. The most likely scenario for Russia’s future will be a slow descent into chaotic discontent, the continued collapse of society and the strengthening of security organs.”

Already, part of her prediction is coming true. Earlier this year, Putin created a new National Guard, a super-agency directly run by the Kremlin and employing 400,000 paramilitary police and troops, as well as helicopter gunships and tanks. The new unit—a modern-day equivalent to the Roman emperors’ Praetorian Guard—is led by Putin's former personal bodyguard Viktor Zolotov and has been specifically authorised by the Duma (the principal legislative assembly) to fire on civilians in cases of civil unrest. In February, Putin said the new unit was designed to “fight terrorism”—and in the next breath warned that Russia's "foes abroad" were preparing to “interfere” with the parliamentary elections on September 18 by organising mass protests, thereby labeling any opponents foreign-backed fifth columnists.

As Putin and his allies dig in to defend their hold on power, Levada is preparing to chronicle the discontent in its usual meticulous detail. “What we are doing is phenomenal, a unique experiment,” says Zorkina. “We are conducting opinion polls in a totalitarian society. Imagine if someone had been able to do that in Nazi Germany.”
0 x

User avatar
peppercorn
Posts: 999
Joined: Sat Sep 13, 2014 6:06 am
Location: Alberta
x 7
x 47
Contact:

Re: Vladimir Putin

Postby peppercorn » Fri Jul 01, 2016 6:29 am

Prom,Prom,Prom......You are packing such a chubby for Putin, not that anything is wrong with that, I think you may be missing a greater danger.... What I am saying is it doesn't matter who is in charge in Russia, actions taken internationaly to date from Russias perspective , are intirely predictable I would dare say justified if you know history and stand in the shoes of whoever holds the presidency in Russia. I submit for your consideration this perspective https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95ODlPasjCM
Not that I agree with all he says, I dont...but I do agree with the trajectory on the subject, ....I may be wrong, hope to hell I am. Events are very serious!..proxy fighting is all fun and games until someone puts a eye out .I suspect things are on hold until Calagula has assumed the throne...but I fully expect events to develop fast then. I couldn't care less how much Putin, his cronies, or Porenshenko and his cronies stuff into their pockets or in off shore banks,(you do know he is now considered the richest man in Ukraine, you get that way if you do everything your told to do). Prom, where did Libya's gold go? Irac's gold? How about Ukraines? I don't think Putins has it,Hey who is getting syrias oil from the Golan hieghts! again I don't think Putin is!!! Hows your garden coming? you may need it soon...maybe we can trade? but I will say ahead of time I am not interested in trading for your Putin nesting doll collection.

(Prom do note I have no factual objection to your posts on putin)
Last edited by peppercorn on Sun Jul 24, 2016 6:04 am, edited 1 time in total.
0 x
a puppet is free, so long as it likes its strings.

User avatar
Antsy
Posts: 412
Joined: Sat Jun 16, 2012 4:44 pm
x 7
Netherlands

Re: Vladimir Putin

Postby Antsy » Tue Jul 19, 2016 11:02 pm

Prom,

TL;DR (I got that gem from my kid ;) )

I'm gonna guess that you really don't like the fella or his politics.
0 x
Needs must when the devil drives.


Return to “War”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest